Media Vault
Lefila website Privacy Policy Terms of Use

MEDIA VAULT / LEGAL

Privacy Policy

Version
1.0
Effective date
1 November 2026

1. Introduction

This Privacy Policy explains how Lefila LLP ("we", "us") handles information when you use the Media Vault application ("Media Vault", "the app").

Media Vault is an application for storing photos and videos in a private, encrypted vault on your own device.

This policy covers the Media Vault application itself. It does not cover services that we do not operate, such as Google Drive, the Apple App Store, or Google Play. Those services have their own privacy policies.

If you do not agree with this policy, please do not use Media Vault.

We have written this policy to match what the application actually does. Where a statement describes a limit of the design, we have said so plainly rather than describing a guarantee we cannot make.

This policy is written in English. If we provide a translation and it differs from the English text, the English text prevails, except where the law of your country requires otherwise.

2. Summary

  • Media Vault stores your media on your own device, inside vault files that are encrypted.
  • While you view, play, share, capture, or import an item, the app can briefly keep a temporary readable copy in its private storage. Section 6 explains when it is deleted and what that means.
  • Media Vault does not require you to create an account with us. There is no Media Vault sign-up, and we do not operate a user account system.
  • We do not operate a server that receives your photos, your videos, or your vault.
  • Media Vault is not configured with any advertising, analytics, attribution, or crash-reporting service.
  • If you choose to enable backup, your encrypted vault data is sent to a cloud account you own and connect: Google Drive, or, on iPhone and iPad, Apple's iCloud Drive. No Media Vault server is involved in that transfer.
  • Some details about your vault are stored in that cloud account in a form that is not encrypted. Section 9 describes exactly what those details are.
  • If you back up a second (decoy) vault, the backup shows that a second vault exists. Section 8 explains.
  • If you lose your passcode and your Recovery Kit, we cannot restore your encrypted content for you. Section 7 explains why.

3. Information the app accesses on your device

This section describes information the application accesses and keeps on your device. Section 4 describes the much smaller set of information that can leave your device.

Photos and videos you choose to import. On iPhone and iPad, the app shows a picker provided by iOS and you select the items to import. On Android, the app shows its own gallery of the photos and videos your device lets it read; on Android 14 and later you can limit that to items you select. While the gallery is open the app can list those items and show their thumbnails, and it reads the contents of an item only when you choose to import it. On Android you can also share items to Media Vault from another app; Section 5 explains how those are handled.

Camera and microphone. If you capture a photo or record a video inside the app, or turn on the optional intruder-alert photo, the app uses the camera and, where a video has sound, the microphone. Captured media is encrypted and written into your vault; until that has happened it is held in a temporary file in the app's private storage (Section 6). It is not saved to your device's camera roll.

Device storage. The app writes encrypted vault files, database files, thumbnails, and journals into its own private storage area on your device. For short periods it can also write temporary readable copies of items there; Section 6 explains when, and how they are removed.

Your passcode, PIN, and Recovery Kit. The app uses the credentials you set to derive encryption keys. Passcodes and PINs are not stored as readable text. Section 6 and Section 7 explain this in more detail.

Vault metadata and application settings. The app keeps a local record of what is in your vault, including item identifiers, sizes, dimensions, durations, album membership, trash state, favourite state, and your settings such as theme, language, grid style, and retention window.

Access log and optional incident photo. If you turn on the access log, the app records unlock attempts on your device: the time, the type of credential used, whether the attempt was accepted or refused, and how many refusals had occurred. If you separately turn on the intruder-alert photo, the app takes one photograph with the front camera after several consecutive refused attempts. The log and any photographs stay on your device, sealed with a key that does not leave it. They are never synced, exported, or sent to us. On a device where all vaults have been erased, the log and its photographs are erased with them.

Device information. The app reads basic information it needs to run, such as the device language and the operating-system version. It does not collect a hardware serial number, an advertising identifier, or a phone number. When you enable backup, the app creates a random label for the device and stores it in your vault so that the app can recognise the changes it wrote itself. This label is a random value generated by the app. It is not derived from your device. It is stored in your vault and, if you enable backup, in the backup records described in Section 9.

Web version. In the web version, the app keeps a few preference values, your theme, your language, and whether you have seen the introduction, in your browser's local storage. The app itself sets no cookies. Section 13 describes how the web version holds your vault.

We do not ask for and do not collect your name, your email address, your phone number, your contacts, your calendar, your location, or your health data.

4. Information that can leave your device

This is the most important section of this policy, so it is deliberately specific.

Media Vault does not upload your photos or videos to servers operated by us. We do not operate a media storage service, and no Media Vault server receives your vault.

Information leaves your device in only these situations:

  1. If you enable Google Drive backup, encrypted vault data is transferred from your device to the Google Drive account you connected. Section 9 describes exactly what is transferred.
  2. If you use Media Vault on an iPhone or iPad and choose iCloud Drive instead of Google Drive, encrypted vault data is transferred to the iCloud Drive account on that device. Section 9 describes exactly what is transferred, and the same limitation on plain-text index records applies.
  3. If you use the in-app browser, the app connects directly to the websites you choose to visit. Those websites receive the requests you make, including your IP address, under their own privacy policies. We do not operate those websites, and we do not receive a record of what you visit. The in-app browser is set up not to keep cookies or page storage, and the app clears what it can when the browser closes and when the vault locks, but it is not an anonymity tool: the sites you visit still see your device.
  4. If you export or share an item, the app hands the item to the destination you choose, such as another application on your device or an operating system share target.
  5. If a purchase is made through the Apple App Store or Google Play, the store processes the transaction. Section 12 describes this.
  6. On iPhone and iPad, your device can make a backup of itself, to iCloud or to a computer. Media Vault asks iOS to leave the folder that holds your vault out of those backups, so the encrypted vault is not meant to travel with them. That is a request to the operating system, which we do not control: Apple's terms and your device settings govern device backups, and we cannot promise that no device backup holds a copy. On Android, the app opts out of Android's automatic backup.
  7. If you use the web version or read these documents online, the host that serves the pages receives the request, including your IP address and browser details, and may keep standard server logs. If you connect Google Drive from the web version, Google sends you back to the same site, so that request is visible to the host as well. These logs do not contain your vault.

In this version of the application, we have found no advertising service, no analytics service, no attribution service, no crash-reporting service, and no telemetry service configured in the app. There is no Media Vault backend endpoint in the application's network layer. The only network destinations the application is built to contact are Google's OAuth and Google Drive endpoints, which are used only when you connect Google Drive backup, and Apple's iCloud services, which are used only when you choose iCloud Drive on an Apple device.

5. Local media and what happens after import

When you import an item, the app reads the file you selected, removes embedded metadata such as GPS coordinates and EXIF fields according to your import settings, encrypts the content, and writes the encrypted result into your vault. The original file is left where it was unless you have enabled the option that removes it after a successful import.

Photographs you take with the in-app camera, and videos you record in the app, are encrypted into the vault and are not written to the system camera roll.

Items shared to Media Vault (Android). If you share an item to Media Vault from another app, the app copies it into its private storage straight away, readable and with its original file name, because the sending app's permission to read it is short-lived. The copy waits there until you unlock the vault and the item is imported. The app then removes it, and clears any copy that is left as described in Section 6.

Deleted items first move to the vault's trash and are removed permanently after the retention window you have chosen, or sooner if you purge them manually. Section 15 explains deletion in more detail.

6. Encryption

Media Vault is designed to protect stored content using encryption.

Media content is encrypted with authenticated encryption before it is stored in your vault. Your vault's keys are derived from the credentials you set, and the app is built so that the keys needed to read your content are held on your device rather than by us.

This means that reading your vault requires the credentials you control. It also means that the protection of your content depends on the strength of your passcode and on your device's own security. Encryption reduces risk. It does not remove it. A weak passcode, a compromised device, an unlocked device in someone else's hands, or a flaw in the operating system can all defeat encryption in practice, and no application can promise otherwise.

Temporary readable copies. Some actions need a readable copy of an item for a short time. Playing a video, showing or zooming some images, creating a thumbnail, sharing or exporting an item, finishing a camera capture before it is sealed into the vault, and, on Android, holding an item that was shared in from another app until it is imported, each use a temporary file in the app's private storage that is not encrypted. The app deletes each copy when it has finished with it, and clears any that are left whenever the vault locks or unlocks and, on Android, when the app starts. Media Vault does not place these copies in your photo library. A copy can still remain if the app is stopped unexpectedly, and anyone who can examine your device's storage or who has taken control of your device may be able to read a copy while it exists. Items you share or export leave the app's control as soon as the receiving app has them (Section 4).

Apple App Store and Google Play, and the operating systems they run on, may hold other information about your installation of the app, such as the fact that you installed it. That is outside our control and is governed by their own policies.

7. Passcodes, PINs, Recovery Kit and account recovery

Your vault is protected by credentials that you control. There is no Media Vault account, and no password reset that we can perform.

When you create a vault, Media Vault generates a Recovery Kit: a twelve-word phrase that you are asked to write down and keep. The Recovery Kit is the supported way to open your vault on a different device, or to regain access if you forget your passcode.

Because the Recovery Kit is generated from fresh random values when it is issued and is not stored anywhere after you are shown it, the app cannot show it to you again later. If you lose it, you can issue a new one from inside the unlocked app, which replaces the old one. Issuing a new Recovery Kit requires your current passcode.

Consequences you should understand before you rely on Media Vault:

  • If you forget your passcode and you do not have a working Recovery Kit, your encrypted content cannot be recovered by us. We hold no copy of your keys and no copy of your content.
  • If you lose your device and you have not enabled backup, and you do not have a Recovery Kit, your encrypted content is gone.
  • If someone else learns your passcode or PIN, or uses your unlocked device, they can open your vault.
  • Biometric unlock and PIN unlock are conveniences. The passcode remains the credential that can change or restore a vault.

Please store your Recovery Kit somewhere separate from the device, in a place you trust.

8. Multiple vaults and decoy vaults

Media Vault may allow multiple independent vaults protected by separate credentials. Each vault has its own credentials and its own encryption material.

A vault that is configured as a decoy behaves as an ordinary vault from the outside. The lock screen does not label vaults, and the app does not show which credential belongs to which vault. Records that the app keeps about unlock attempts do not carry a vault identifier.

This design is intended to make a second vault hard to notice on your device. It is not a guarantee. It does not protect against an adversary who can analyse your device, compel you to unlock it, or watch you enter credentials, and it does not hide the second vault from your cloud account, as the next paragraph explains.

Cloud backup shows that a second vault exists. If you back up to Google Drive or iCloud Drive while you use a managed second vault, the backup contains a plain-text companion record for the pair and a separate backup folder for the second vault (Section 9). Anyone with access to that cloud account, including the provider, can therefore tell that more than one vault exists, although not what either one contains. If concealing that matters to you, do not rely on the second vault together with cloud backup.

9. Cloud backup and restore

Backup is optional. It is off unless you connect an account. Media Vault can back up to one cloud account that you own, and you choose which one:

  • Google Drive, on Android, iPhone, iPad, and the web.
  • iCloud Drive, on iPhone and iPad only. In the app's cloud screen, choosing iCloud Drive switches the backup from Google Drive to the iCloud Drive account already signed in on that device.

Everything below applies to whichever provider you chose. Where only one is meant, it is named.

Connecting to Google Drive. When you choose to connect, Media Vault opens Google's own consent screen in a secure browser view. Google asks you to approve access. Media Vault requests access to the application's private data area in Google Drive, which Google calls the app data folder. Media Vault does not request access to the rest of your Drive, and it does not request access to your Google profile, your Gmail, your contacts, or your calendar. The access token that Google issues is encrypted and stored inside your vault on your device. Media Vault does not receive your Google password.

Connecting to iCloud Drive. On an Apple device, Media Vault uses the iCloud Drive account already signed in on that device, through the app's own storage container. Media Vault does not ask you for an Apple ID and never receives your Apple password.

What is uploaded. When backup runs, Media Vault uploads to the private area the app owns inside your chosen account:

  • Your encrypted media files. The content itself is encrypted before it is uploaded.
  • A vault header file that contains the parameters used to derive your keys and your wrapped key material. This file does not contain your passcode, your Recovery Kit words, or your media content.
  • A small companion file for a vault pair, when a managed second vault is configured.
  • An index record for each item, and a replication document for each album.

What is not encrypted in the upload. This is important, and it is a real limitation of the current design:

  • For each item, Media Vault writes a small plain-text index record. It contains the item's internal identifier, a hash and byte size of the encrypted content, the media format, the pixel dimensions, the duration, when the item was added, when its record last changed, the device label described in Section 3, and whether the item is in the trash or marked as a favourite.
  • For each item, the original file name and, if you kept it, the capture date are stored in encrypted form. Their readable form is not uploaded.
  • For each album, a small plain-text record holds the album's internal identifier, a revision time, the device label, and whether the album is deleted. The album's name and its member list are uploaded in encrypted form.
  • The vault header and the pair companion file described above are stored as plain text. They hold key-derivation parameters and key material that is already wrapped with your passcode-derived key, so they do not reveal your passcode, and they cannot be used to read your content without your credentials.

What this means in practice. Anyone who obtains access to the cloud account you backed up to, including Google or Apple, can see that a vault exists, can see whether you use a managed second vault, and can learn the number of items, their formats, their pixel dimensions, their durations, their encrypted sizes, and their time records. They cannot read your photos, your videos, your file names, or your album names from these records without your credentials, because the content and those fields are encrypted.

Where the backup goes. On Google Drive, the backup is placed in the application's private app data folder inside the account you connected. That area is not shown in the normal Google Drive interface, so you will not see a vault folder among your files. On iCloud Drive, the backup is placed in the app's own container, likewise not presented to you as a folder of files. In both cases Media Vault uses an opaque folder name derived from the vault identifier, so the folder name does not reveal the vault identifier. Each vault has its own folder, so the number of folders shows how many vaults you back up.

Who can see it. The transfer is between your device and Google, or between your device and Apple. Media Vault operates no server that receives, stores, or can read the contents of your backup.

Availability. Google Drive is operated by Google and iCloud Drive is operated by Apple. Neither is operated by us. Backups are subject to those providers' own terms of service, privacy policies, storage limits, availability, and account decisions. We cannot guarantee that your backup will remain available, that either provider will keep its service unchanged, or that a restore will succeed. We do not control either provider's retention or synchronisation behaviour, and on iCloud Drive, removing the application or turning iCloud Drive off for it may affect what remains. Do not treat a cloud backup as your only copy of anything that matters to you.

Retention and deletion. Backup records stay in the cloud account you used until they are removed. Section 15 describes how deletion works and what its limits are.

10. Analytics, diagnostics and crash reports

This version of Media Vault is built without an advertising service, an analytics service, an attribution service, a crash-reporting service, or any other telemetry service. No third-party analytics or crash-reporting library is configured.

The Settings screen contains a usage-analytics preference. It is off by default. In this version it records only your choice, so that the preference is available if analytics is added later. No usage data is collected or transmitted, whichever way you set it.

Media Vault does write diagnostic information about its own backup and sync activity. This diagnostic output is enabled only in development builds of the Android application. In release builds it is switched off, and it is not enabled on any other platform. This diagnostics output never contains your media content, your passcode, your keys, your Recovery Kit words, or your file names.

11. Advertising

Media Vault contains no advertising and no advertising libraries. We do not use your vault content, your usage of the app, or any identifier to select advertisements for you.

12. Purchases

This version of Media Vault does not sell anything inside the application. There is no paywall, no subscription screen, and no in-app purchase flow. We are not aware of any purchase data being processed for this version of the app.

The application does include the software development kit of a purchase-management provider, RevenueCat, in preparation for possible future paid features. In this version no store key is configured for that kit, so it is not initialised and it does not run. If paid features are introduced in a future version, we will update this policy before they are made available, and the following will apply:

  • Purchases of subscriptions or a lifetime option would be processed by the Apple App Store or Google Play, not by us.
  • We would receive confirmation that a purchase was made and which entitlement it grants. We would not receive your full payment card details.
  • The store would handle billing, renewals, cancellations, and refunds under its own policies.
  • The purchase provider would process a purchase identifier and app-level technical information in order to validate the entitlement.

If you purchase through the Apple App Store or Google Play, that store also processes information about you as an independent controller. Its own privacy policy applies to that processing.

13. Permissions

Media Vault asks for permissions only to provide features you use. It does not request permission for advertising or profiling.

On Android, the application declares:

  • Access to photos and videos. Used by the app's own gallery so you can choose items to import. On Android 13 and later these are the image and video media permissions, and on Android 14 and later you can grant access to selected items only. On Android 12 and earlier they are the legacy external storage permissions.
  • Camera. Used when you capture a photo or record a video inside the app, and when you turn on the optional intruder-alert photo. The camera permission is requested when you first use a camera feature, never from the lock screen. Camera hardware is declared as optional, so a device without a camera can still install and use the application without those features.
  • Internet access. Used to connect Google Drive for backup and restore, and for the in-app browser. If paid features are added in a future version, it would also be used to check purchases (Section 12).
  • Biometric access. Used to let you unlock a vault with your fingerprint or face instead of typing a passcode, if you enable that.
  • Permissions added by the operating system libraries the app uses, such as network-state access, wake-lock, and the ability to run and reschedule scheduled work. These do not display a prompt and do not grant access to personal data.

On iOS, the application requests:

  • Camera access. Used to capture photos directly into your encrypted vault, and, if you turn it on, to take an intruder-alert photo after repeated refused unlock attempts.
  • Microphone access. Used only while you record a video inside the app.
  • Photos access. Used so the app can remove an original item after an import, and only when you have explicitly enabled that option.
  • Face ID. Used to unlock a vault, if you enable it.
  • iCloud Drive. Used, if you choose iCloud Drive as your backup destination, to store the app's encrypted backup in the iCloud Drive account already signed in on the device. Access is to the app's own container, not to your other iCloud files.

Media Vault does not request location, contacts, calendar, health, notification, or advertising-identifier permissions.

Platform-specific behaviour: Media Vault is available on Android and iOS, and a web version also exists. On Android, backup uses Google Drive. On iPhone and iPad, you may choose either Google Drive or iCloud Drive. The web version works differently: it holds your vault in your browser's memory for the current session only, so reloading or closing the tab ends the session and removes that copy, and a connected cloud backup is what lets you open your vault again. It has no native picker, camera, or on-device biometrics, and it cannot use iCloud Drive. The vault format and the encryption are the same on every platform.

14. Data retention

We do not keep your vault, your media, or your keys, because we never receive them. The retention rules below describe what your own device and your own cloud account hold, and the small amount of information you send us when you contact us.

Local vault data. Your encrypted vault, its database, its thumbnails and its journals stay on your device until you delete them. Deleting an item moves it to the vault trash; the trash is emptied after the retention window you have chosen, which defaults to 30 days, or sooner if you purge it.

Temporary copies. The temporary readable copies described in Section 6 are deleted when the app has finished with them, and any that are left are cleared whenever the vault locks or unlocks and, on Android, when the app starts.

Vault and access-log data. When you erase a vault, its local data is deleted. When the last vault on a device is erased, the on-device access log and any intruder-alert photographs are erased with it. Intruder-alert photographs are also removed automatically after their retention window, which defaults to 30 days, and the app keeps at most ten of them.

Cloud backup. Backup records stay in the cloud account you used until they are removed. If you erase a vault while a backup is connected, Media Vault asks that provider to remove the backup objects. Google Drive moves deleted objects to its own trash and purges them on its own schedule; Apple's iCloud Drive behaviour is Apple's to determine. Because of that, a copy may remain recoverable in the cloud account for a period after you erase the vault, and a copy may also persist if the cloud account was unreachable at the time, or if you had deleted the local vault by other means.

Diagnostics. As described in Section 10, release builds do not transmit diagnostics.

Web server logs. If you use the web version or read these documents online, the host that serves them may keep standard server logs for as long as its own settings allow. They are not part of your vault.

Support requests. If you contact us, we keep your message and our reply for as long as needed to handle the request and to meet any record-keeping obligation. There is no in-app support submission; you contact us using the address in Section 20.

15. Deleting your data

Media Vault gives you direct control over deletion. The following actions exist in the application:

  • Deleting an item. Removing an item from your vault moves it to the vault trash. It is then removed permanently after the retention window, or immediately if you purge it.
  • Emptying the trash. You can purge a single trashed item or the entire trash. A typed confirmation is required.
  • Erasing a vault. Erasing a vault removes its local data from your device and asks the cloud provider you backed up to, to remove its backup objects, if a backup is connected. The confirmation requires you to type a specific word. Erasing is refused if the connected cloud account cannot be reached, so that a local erase cannot silently leave an unreachable cloud copy behind. If the local deletion itself fails, the vault stays locked but intact and the erase can be retried.
  • Removing the application. Uninstalling Media Vault removes its local data from your device. It does not remove a cloud backup. To remove a cloud backup, erase the vault from inside the app first, or manage the data in your Google Drive or iCloud Drive account. Media Vault asks iOS to keep its vault out of device backups (Section 4); uninstalling does not reach into a device backup that holds a copy regardless.
  • Pausing backup. Pausing backup stops future uploads. It does not delete backup objects that already exist, and the cloud account stays connected.
  • Disconnecting backup. In the app's cloud screen, Disconnect backup stops this device from backing up and makes it forget the connected account (the saved sign-in and the account's name). It does not delete the backup from your cloud account, and it does not withdraw Media Vault's permission in your Google account; to do that, use your Google Account's security settings. Items you add after disconnecting stay on this device only until you connect again. If you later erase the vault, the app first asks you to reconnect, so that the backup can be removed as part of the erase.

Limits you should know about. The cloud providers Media Vault uses do not offer an immediate permanent delete through the interfaces it calls. On Google Drive, deleted backup objects are moved to Drive's trash and purged by Google on its own schedule. A backup object can also survive if the cloud account was unreachable at the moment you erased the vault. For these reasons, Media Vault does not claim that erasing a vault guarantees the immediate and total destruction of every copy in the cloud.

Media Vault has no account to delete, because it has no account system.

16. Children's privacy

Media Vault is a general-purpose tool for storing private photos and videos. It is intended for adults: it is not directed at children, it is not designed for use by children, and the Terms of Use require you to be at least 18. We do not knowingly collect personal information from children, and we do not operate an account system through which a child's information would be provided to us.

If you believe a child has used Media Vault in a way that raises a concern for you, please contact us using the address in Section 20.

17. International users

Media Vault is operated by Lefila LLP, whose registered address is 60 Paya Lebar Road, #06-28 Paya Lebar Square, Singapore 409051. If you use the in-app browser or connect Google Drive, your information may be handled by the providers of those services in other countries under their own policies.

Where the law of your country gives you rights over personal data, we will honour those rights to the extent they apply to the limited information described in this policy. Because we hold no account and no copy of your vault, there is usually no information about you for us to retrieve, correct, or delete.

If you are in the European Economic Area, the United Kingdom, or another place with similar data protection law: the only personal information we hold about you is what you send us when you contact us, such as your email address and your message. We use it to answer you and to keep a record of the request, on the basis of our legitimate interest in handling enquiries, or where the law requires us to keep it. We process it in Singapore and with the email service we use, and we do not sell it or use it for advertising. You can ask us for access to it, to correct or delete it, to restrict or object to our use of it, or to receive a copy, and you can complain to your local data protection authority. We do not make decisions about you by automated means. Write to the privacy address in Section 20.

18. Singapore

The operator of Media Vault is currently based in Singapore, and this policy is written to work with Singapore's Personal Data Protection Act ("PDPA") to the extent it applies.

Under the PDPA, an organisation must generally obtain consent before collecting, using, or disclosing personal data, must notify individuals of the purposes of that collection, must allow access to and correction of personal data it holds, and must protect personal data with reasonable security arrangements. Where the PDPA applies to us, we intend to meet those obligations.

In practice, and as described in this policy, Media Vault is designed so that we hold almost no personal data. Your media, your vault, and your credentials stay on your device. The information that leaves your device goes to your own Google Drive or iCloud Drive account. If you make a support request, we will hold the information you send us for the purpose of responding to it.

If you have a question or a concern about how your personal data has been handled, or you want to ask for access to or correction of the personal data we hold about you, please write to our data protection contact at the privacy address in Section 20. If we ever suffer a data breach that the PDPA requires us to notify, we will notify the Personal Data Protection Commission and the people affected as it requires. Please note that we cannot recover an encrypted vault, and no request can make us able to do so, because we do not hold your keys.

19. Changes to this policy

We may update this policy as the application changes. When we do, we will update the effective date at the top of this document and, where the change is significant, we will provide a notice in the application or in the release notes for the version that carries the change.

If you do not agree with an updated policy, stop using Media Vault. Where the law requires us to ask for your consent to a change, we will ask for it.

20. Contact

For questions about this policy, or about privacy in Media Vault, contact:

Lefila LLP

60 Paya Lebar Road, #06-28 Paya Lebar Square, Singapore 409051

Privacy and data protection enquiries: support@lefila.com

General support: support@lefila.com

A Lefila LLP app · © 2026

Operator: Lefila LLP · 60 Paya Lebar Road, #06-28 Paya Lebar Square, Singapore 409051

Support: support@lefila.com

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